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# **March 2006 Force Structure Assessment Decision Brief**

**Problem Statement:** *How can we adjust our force structure to best allow us to meet our strategic objectives?*

The overall classification of this brief is ~~SECRET//REL TO AUS, CAN, AND GBR//ORCON//20151214~~

As of: 03 Mar 06

ACTO: (b)(3), (b)(6)



~~SECRET//REL TO MCFI~~



## 1/10 MTN Decision Linkage

### Decisions

- ★ **BTT Realignment (20 Feb MNC --- Mar MNF)**
  - Regional BTT and MiTT Remain vic Najaf
- ★ **Theater Security Forces allocated to Baghdad**
  - Backfills A/C 1-121 IN (329 Soldiers)
- ◆ **8 IA Assumes (Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit, Karbala)**
  - 1/8 IA (Apr 06); 2/8 IA (Apr 06)
  - DIV, BDE, BN MiTTs
  - PRT (Najaf) w/ Reg (BTT)
  - Regional PRT in FOB Kalsu
- ★ **Curtail 1/10 MTN (TOA 30 Apr 06) (Current Plan)**
  - 3/6 IA and 5/6 IA (Mar 06)
  - Abu Ghraib not closed
- ◆ **Close Abu Ghraib / Occupy Camp Cropper (May)**
  - Prisoner Release 15 Jun 06
- ★ **BOG 1/10 MTN (TOA - 01 Jul 06) (Proposed)**
  - Tactical Overwatch Baghdad
  - Abu Ghraib definitely closed

### B/S Realignment Affecting Off-Ramp

**YES = No need for CF South of City of Najaf**  
**NO = Cannot Reduce B/S 2/4 BCT covers twice B/S**

**Backfill TQ Requirements May 2006**

**YES = MND-B Lead in Baghdad & Babil Only**

- Tactical Overwatch in Najaf, Karbala, Wasit, Qadisiyah
- Start Transfer FOB Charlie & Duke move to Babil
- Work Temporary Boundary Change 8 IA S of Kalsu
- June Start rolling up BN MiTTs

**YES = Same Battlespace; BN (-) to VBC; ABU G BN**

- 2/101 AA twice the B/S & 3/6 IA only assumed 1 month
- 2/101 AA possible unit for curtailment (Aug-Sep)

**NO = No Closure - Bn must remain to guard**

**YES = Frees up BN (+) not required to Backfill**

**YES = Realign Battlespace between 2/101 AA & 3/6 IA**

- Reassign Tasks between 2/101 AA and 3/6 IA



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
## Background and Timeline



**Problem Statement:** How can we adjust our force structure to best allow us to meet our strategic objectives?

### **Background:**

- CENTCOM Posturing for the Long War plan
- JS approved OIF 06-08 Force Rotation is 13 x BCTs in Iraq + 1 x BCT for Call Forward and 1 x BCT PTDO (No URF Backfill Identified for 1/10 MTN and 2-28 IN)
- CFC FRAGO 09-928 Establishment of CENTCOM Theater Reserve
- OIF 06-08 sourced for 13 + 1 + 1 x BCTs
- Off Ramping Potential based on ISF Capabilities
- Other factors relating to the decision:
  - Threat Environment
  - Battlespace and Partnership Realignment
  - Off Ramp Model (4 IA BDEs  $\equiv$  1 US BDE)
  - Provincial Conditions
  - Risk (Operational / Strategic)



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
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## Facts and Assumptions



### Facts

1. 2-28 BOG: 26 JUN 06 1/10 BOG: 11 AUG 06
2. TOA occurs 10 days before BOG
3. Decision to return 1-506 IN to MND-B NLT 15 Apr 06
4. 2 BCT, 1 AD (Theater Reserve) provides CDR USCENTCOM with operational flexibility to the shape the AOR and respond to terrorist attacks
5. Corps Decisive Operation – Battlespace Transition
6. Off Ramp Model: 4 IA BDE  $\equiv$  1 CF BDE
7. 1-10 MTN currently 1x BDE & 4x BN MiTTs OOH (Ext fill Apr 06)
8. 2-28 IN currently 2x BN MiTTs OOH
9. MNF-W internal MiTTs provided: 2x BDE and 6x BN MiTTs
10. MNF-W will receive the Theater Security backfill



### Assumptions

1. ISF development continues and ISF assumes battlespace as projected (Mar 06 Assessment) ✓
2. Sunni insurgency will not expand; over time, political inclusion will diminish rejectionist component of insurgency so ISF can contain
3. AIF attack trends will continue in the same battlespace
4. 3 non-US MND HQs remain through 2006 (UK, POL, ROK)
5. MoI forces in Key Cities assume counter-insurgency lead by end 2006
6. Provincial elections in mid-July timeframe
7. Camp Cropper will be completed by late May 06. ✓
8. Prisoner transfer from Abu Ghraib to Cropper complete NET 1 JUN ✓
9. Curtailed unit sustain enablers, including TTs, through BOG date ✓
10. External MiTT teams (1 BDE & 4 BN) replacing 1/10 ready for employment NLT Apr 06
11. Most TPE from 1/10 MTN and 2/28 IN remains in theater for redistribution. Excess Property turned in prior to RIP/ TOA. ✓
12. All of 8IA assumes battlespace NLT Jul 06
13. Najaf, Sulaymaniyah, & Dahouk relieved of BN / BDE BTTs

### Constraints

1. 15 day RIP/TOA model – No Backfill Model
2. 10 day post TOA Retrograde to meet BOG
3. Base Closure/Transfer Process (100 Day model)
4. BCT Realignment requires Disruption of Partnerships (OOH TTs)
5. PRT, PTT, MiTT security/support requirements

### Issues

1. Abu Ghraib Transfer Timeline
2. Realign BTT requirements for Regions 1 & 5 DBE Border units





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# ***Transition Readiness Assessment***


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## Projected IA Division and Brigade Assumption of Battlespace (based on MAR TRA data)



- 3/7 and 2/9 in force generation 3/9 not formed
- 7 IA DIV HQ assumes battlespace in Jan 07
- 9 IA DIV HQ is still in force generation



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## US Offramp Opportunities (1 FEB TRA Data)



	FEB 06	MAR 06	APR 06	MAY 06	JUN 06	JUL06	AUG 06	SEP 06	OCT 06	NOV 06	DEC 06
MND-N	2	3	4	6	8	9	11	12			
MND-B	3	5	7			8	9				
MNF-W	3	4				5	6				



= CF BDE offramp opportunity

Offramp Opportunity Model

4 x IA BDE = 1 CF BDE





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## MND-B Conditions (30 April 06)

### **Threat:**

- No known sanctuary in MND-B Sector.
- Increase in Effective Attack trends over past 90 day period.
- No apparent increase in T&FF flow into MND-Baghdad.
- Sectarian violence increase in trend over past 90 days.
- |            |
|------------|
| 1.4b, 1.4d |
|------------|
- |            |
|------------|
| 1.4b, 1.4d |
|------------|

 by transiting funds and MOIS into Iraq.

### **Security:**

- 5 of 8 (63%) of IA Brigades at TRA Level 2, assumed battlespace (Baghdad)
- 1 Jul 06 – 6 of 8 (75%) of IA Brigades at TRA Level 2, assumed battlespace (Baghdad)
- Iraqi Police at Provincial Level maintaining domestic order – some areas need improvement.
- Formal agreement for MOD and MOI roles/missions (Joint MOU).
- National Police (2 POBs, 1 CMDO, 1 MECH) Operating in Baghdad.

### **Governance/Economic:**

- National Ministerial Capacity needs improvement.
- National government able to improve essential services.
- No Provincial Budget to improve essential services
- No significant increase in employment.
- Abu Ghraib does not fall under Amanat for essential services.
- Still No National Logistical System – Contract Logistics Standard

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## MND-N Conditions (15 May 06)

### *Threat:*

- No known sanctuary in MND-N
- **Infrastructure attacks increased over past 90 days**
- Decrease in attack trends in Ninawa over 90 day period
- No apparent increase in T&FF flow across into Ninawa (threat due to WERV operations)
- **Sectarian violence increase in trend over past 90 days.**
- **T&FF will continue to use northern corridor as smuggling route into Iraq**

### *Security:*

- **May 06 - 0 of 3 (0%) of II) BDEs at TRA Level 2, assume battlespace (Ninawa) but improved by 3 months in March TRA**
- Iraqi Police at Provincial, District and Station Level in place and functioning
- PJCC Operational and working with PRDC and PRT (functional) in Mosul
- Border Security Forces tactical integration linked in with 3 IA BDE at Sinjar

### *Governance/Economic:*

- **National Ministerial Capacity needs improvement.**
- **Local Government incapable at providing essential services**
- **Lack of Electricity hampering economic and employment growth**

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15 + 1 x BCT Set	Projected 13 + 1 x BCT Set
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- Provides most time to plan / execute future B/S realignment



1

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10; 2	

71

2

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





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# COA 1: Curtail 1/10 (30 Apr 06); Curtail 2-28 (15 May 06)



- 1/10 MTN**
- 30 Apr 06 TOA with internal realignment
  - MND-B Realigns Battlespace (5 BCTs) (2/101 & 1/4 refocus)
  - Security tasks for Abu Ghraib remain – must be reassigned
  - Partnerships in 1/6 and 3/6 IA realigned
  - 6 and 8 IA have not completely assumed battlespace
  - 2/1 AD Remains as the Theater Reserve
- 2-28 IN / 1/1 AD (-)**
- 15 May TOA w/ 1/1 AD (-)
  - MND-N sends 1/1 AD (-) to Ramadi
  - 2-37 AR remains in Tal Afar, 1-36 in Hit Feb 06
  - 172 SBCT increases battlespace to Sinjar (Attach 2-37 AR)
  - W - SW Ninawa – 2 & 3 IA partnered with 172 SBCT
  - Provincial Reconstruction Team Operational in Ninawa
  - 2/1 AD Remains as the Theater Reserve

<b>Curtail Apr 06</b>	<b>Curtail May 06</b>
<b>1/10 MTN</b>	<b>2/28 ID</b>

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**COA 2 Projections IA Division/Brigade, Partnership and MITT**  
**Requirements (Based on MAR TRA data)**

15 + 1 x BCT Set

Projected  
13 + 1 x BCT Set

**Risk:**


- **Threat:** 5.2% of AIF attacks occur in the 1/10 and 1/1 AOs (30 attacks per week).
- **Seams & Gaps:** Abu Ghraib Qada & Western Ninawa
- **TRA:** 27 out of 36 IA Bde Level 2 or better (All 6 & 8 IA except 4/6 in Aug); All 3 IA Bdes TRA Level 3
- **Partnership Transitions:** 6

**Transition Teams:**

- No additional external transition teams required.
- 1/10 will receive backfill in April. 1/1 provides no internal MITTs.
- RFF submitted for next three curtail / BOGs. 15 MITTs + 252 x augmentees required NET Aug 06

**Discussion:**

- Strategic advantages, perception of improved GOI and ISF capability
- Curtail / BOG conditions are met (Abu Ghraib transfer)
- Curtail / BOG occurs prior to potential election window
- Provides more time to plan / execute future B/S realignment



- 3/7 and 2/9 in force generation 3/9 not formed
- 7 IA DIV HQ assumes battlespace in Jan 07
- 9 IA DIV HQ is still in force generation

13/36 16/36 19/36 23/36 27/36 31/36 32/36 33/36 33/36 33/36

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


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


# COA 2: BOG 2-28 IN (26 Jun 06); Curtail 1/10 MTN (1 Jul 06)

## 2/28 IN Timeline



## 1/10 MTN Timeline



## Curtail / BOG Review

### 1/10 MTN

- 1 JUL 06 internal TOA
- Abu Ghraib transfer complete
- All of 6 & 8 IA assumed under their DIV HQs
- Battlespace below N. Babil under overwatch
- Provincial Reconstruction Team – Baghdad Operational
- 2/1 AD Remains as Theater Reserve

### 2-28 IN / 1/1 AD(-)

- 16 Jun TOA w/ 1/1 AD (-)
- MND-N sends 1/1 AD (-) to Ramadi
- 2-37 AR remains in Tal Afar, 1-36 in Hit Feb 06
- 172 SBCT increases battlespace to Sinjar
- West- SW Ninawa – 2 & 3 IA partnered with 172 SBCT
- Provincial Reconstruction Team Operational in Ninawa
- 2/1 AD Remains as Theater Reserve

BOG  
Jun 06



2/28 ID

Curtail  
Jul 06



1/10 MTN

THEATER  
SECURITY



48 BCT

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**15 + 1 x BCT Set**

**Projected  
13 + 1 x BCT Set**

- More time to consolidate and reorganize battlespace


2/28 1

Total BCTs: 2  
Personnel: 7472

Total TTs: 15  
Personnel: 421

JAN06	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC06
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- 3/7 and 2/9 in force generation 3/9 not formed
- 7 IA DIV HQ assumes battlespace in Jan 07
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13/36 16/36 19/36 23/36 27/36 31/36 32/36 33/36 33/36 33/36

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## Recommendation: COA 2




**Recommendation: Continue with Current Off-Ramp Schedule if Following Are Set:**

- BOG 2-28 IN, TOA 16 Jun 06 – No backfill ✓
- Curtail 1/10 MTN 1 Jul 06 (curtail = TOA) - No backfill

### Conditions:

- 1/10 MTN (July 2006):
  - Abu Ghraib prisoners transferred to Camp Cropper
  - 1 JUL 06: All 6 & 8 IA BDEs have assumed battlespace under their DIV HQs (except 4/6: Aug)
  - Victory Base Security Plan resolved to consolidate Security Missions
  - No Increase in “Effective Attacks” throughout MND-Baghdad
  - Improvement in essential services, continuity of civil projects in Abu Ghraib
- 2/28 IN (1/1 AD) (June 2006):
  - 01 Jun 06: 2/2, 3/2, 1/3, 2/3, 3/3 IA only units still Level 3 in MND-N
  - BOG of 26 Jun 06 provides MND-N more time to consolidate and reorganize battlespace
  - No increase in “Effective Attacks” in MND-N
  - Improvement in essential services, continuity of civil projects in Tal Afar



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## Off Ramp Courses of Action



### Theater Reserve

COAs 1, 2, & 3 –  
Recommend retaining  
2/1 AD and continuing to  
examine each quarterly  
decision (Jun 06)

**Rationale:** Risk Mitigation  
for off-ramps and provides  
operational flexibility given  
threat and elections

13 + 1 BCTs


### Potential PTDO Candidates

2/1 ID	2/1 AD (-)	2/10 MTN
Jun 06	Nov 06*	Aug 06

\* 2/1 AD available until Nov 06

JAN06 FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC06 JAN07

### COA 1 --- 1/10 Curtail (30 Apr); 2-28 Curtail (15 May)



### COA 2 --- 2-28 BOG (26 Jun); 1/10 Curtail (1 Jul)



### COA 3 --- 2-28 BOG (26 Jun); 1/10 BOG (11 Aug)



\* Curtailing Affects Sourcing of Internal MiTTs, PRT Security, Partnerships, and Multiple RIPs

= 90 day review

= DP for 1/10 & 2/28







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# COA 3: BOG 2-28 IN (26 Jun 06); BOG 1/10 MTN (11 Aug 06)



## Curtail / BOG Review

### 1/10 MTN

- 1 Aug TOA with internal backfill
- RIP/TOA during potential election window
- 2/1 AD Remains as Theater Reserve
- Provincial Reconstruction Team – Baghdad Operational
- Abu Gharib Transfer Complete; 6 IA positioned to secure Abu G

### 2-28 IN / 1/1 AD(-)

- 16 Jun TOA w/ 1/1 AD (-)
- MND-N sends 1/1 AD (-) to Ramadi (AR, CAV, FA)
- 2-37 AR remains in Tal Afar, 1-36 in Hit
- 172 SBCT increases battlespace to Sinjar
- West- SW Ninawa – 2 & 3 IA partnered with 172 SBCT
- Provincial Reconstruction Team Operational in Ninawa
- 2/1 AD Remains as Theater Reserve

BOG  
Jun 06



2/28 ID

BOG  
Aug 06



1/10 MTN

THEATER  
SECURITY  
48 BCT

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## Strategic Risk



Curtail / BOG BCTs / Theater Reserve remains in Kuwait				
Risk	2nd Order Effects	3rd Order Effects	Risk Mitigation	Residual Risk
International media question premature US withdrawal, and GOI ill-prepared	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insurgents increase effort for Info Ops win</li> <li>• Coalition nations seek to accelerate own withdrawal</li> </ul>	Coalition off-ramp plans impact US ability to off-ramp BCTs and/or enablers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordinated US and theater message</li> <li>• Maintain Theater Reserve in place at TF (+) level</li> <li>• Enhanced Coalition engagement</li> </ul>	Low - Medium
Loss of Operational Flexibility with Curtailments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MNC-I loses some ability to assume risk greater than medium level</li> <li>• IO - AQAM claims victory</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MAS moves to gain more power as CF leaves</li> <li>• Directs large Shia moves to force reaction from GOI and possibly CF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IO Campaign predicting power grab but urging support to GOI</li> <li>• Link redeployment and curtailments to conditions achieved</li> <li>• BCT/UA PTDO Status</li> </ul>	Medium
IA unit suffers defeat after curtailment / BOG of BCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insurgents (especially T&amp;FF) continue the fight to exploit seam/gap to break Coalition will</li> <li>• Insurgents gain IO win that sustains their will to continue the fight</li> <li>• MND must rush forces to affected area – degrades legitimate government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Iraqis feel they may be abandoned and decrease assistance / cooperation with CF</li> <li>• Perception that CF are leaving before ISF are ready</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IO campaign explaining ISF ready to assume missions under GOI control</li> <li>• Increase MiTT coverage and partnership contact immediately following offramp</li> <li>• Designate IA OPRES</li> <li>• IP Development</li> </ul>	Low - Medium
Not curtailing forces creates perception that the Coalition is failing – opens door for AQAM to take initiative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continued degradation of Coalition will to sustain fight</li> <li>• Increased political stress on Coalition nations to seek early exit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concerted effort both IO and kinetic to cause casualties to CF and ISF to demonstrate losing effort</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concerted PAO Campaign to describe CF planned turnover of mission to a new ally – Iraq</li> <li>• Establish Adaptable Theater Reserve construct for rapid reinforcement</li> </ul>	Low

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